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THE AWKWARD STATUS OF COLORADO REAL
PROPERTY IN A DECEDENT'S ESTATE
By WM. C. McGEHEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, title to real property is said to pass instantly
from one owner to the next. This concept of immediate passage of
title to real property is a consequence of the abhorrence of the com-
mon law for a gap in the seisin and its insistence that title should
never be in nubibus. Thus, when an owner of real property dies,
title to that property vests immediately in his devisees or his heirs,
depending on whether he died testate or intestate. The personal
property of a decedent, however, vests in his personal representa-
tive for ultimate distribution to his legatees or next of kin. Actually,
the person or persons in whom title to real property vests immedi-
ately on death may not be known definitely for weeks, or even
months, if there is controversy or uncertainty as to the validity or
meaning of a will, or if the identity, relationship, legitimacy or
survival of purported heirs is in doubt. This delay often negates,
in fact, the certainty which the common law purports to achieve
by the theory of immediate vesting. The common law attempts
to explain such delays by resort to a second theory, namely, that
when the heirs or devisees are identified with centainty, the find-
ing "relates back" to the date of death.
Devisees or heirs in whom immediate title to real property
vested enjoyed all the privileges of ownership, free from any right
of, or interference by, the decedent's personal representative. This
isolation of the real property of a decedent from the administration
of his estate has become increasingly undesirable and impractical
for several reasons.' Foremost among these reasons are the changes
which have occurred in the nature of real property itself and in the
manner in which it is owned. We have changed from a society in
which the usual situation was that of fee simple ownership of a
residence or farm, occupied by the owner, to one in which it is
common to find many different estates in the same piece of real
property and multiple ownership of these estates. In the case of
farms, ranches or other rural properties one now finds that the
surface and mineral estates often are separately owned, in whole
or in part. The mineral estate is frequently subject to an oil and
gas lease or other mineral lease and these leases, in turn, give rise
to working interests, royalty interests and sometimes overriding
royalties. Mineral, leasehold and royalty interests are often owned
in small fractions by many persons who invest in such interests
in much the same way one invests in corporate shares. Similarly,
the surface estate may be the subject of a number of interests,
* Member of the Denver firm of Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and
Grover.
1 See Basye, Abolition of the Distinction Between Real and Personal Proper-
ty in the Administration of Decedents' Estate, 51 ILL. BAR J. 214 (1962)
Efficient Administration of Estates, 102 TRUSTS & ESTATES 902 (1963).
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such as agricultural, grazing or timber leases, and rights of way
for roads, ditches, reservoirs and pipe lines.
Equally complicated interests exist in urban real estate. Per-
haps the most sophisticated real property interest yet developed is
the ownership of a piece of air, exemplified by the condominium.
Such an interest could well be termed "intangible real property,"
creating an interesting real property counterpart to the well
recognized phenomenon of intangible personal property.
In addition, improved means of transportation and communica-
tion and the increasing availability of investment capital have given
rise to more frequent instances of nonresident ownership of real
property.
The increasingly complex nature of interests in real property,
the fragmentation of ownership thereof, and the growth in non-
resident ownership create many situations in which it is impossible
or impractical for heirs or devisees to assume possession and man-
agement of real property upon the death of the owner.
The other major factor which militates against the isolation
of a decedent's real property from the administration of his estate
is the fact that in many instances, particularly since the imposition
of death taxes, the personal property of a decedent is insufficient
to pay death taxes, expenses of administration and other claims
against the decedent's estate, thereby making it necessary to resort
to the real property, or at least to the income therefrom.
For the reasons mentioned, many states, including Colorado,
have passed statutes modifying the common law to the extent that
real property which is within the jurisdiction of the probate court
is made "subject to administration." Our statute which so provides
states in pertinent part:
Every personal representative, by virtue of his office,
shall have power, and it shall be his duty to receive, take
possession of, sue for, recover and preserve the estate, both
real and personal coming to his attention or knowledge,
and the rents, issues and profits arising therefrom. All of
such property and the rents, issues and profits arising
therefrom shall be assets in the hands of the personal rep-
resentative for the payment of debts, widow's, wife's,
orphan's or minor's allowance, expenses of administration
and legacies, in accordance with the will and the prefer-
ences granted by law, to be administered under the direc-
tion of the court.
2
The personal representative also is given statutory authority,
where not otherwise authorized by will, to sell or mortgage real
property "whenever it shall appear necessary or expedient for the
best interest of any estate or the persons in interest therein, having
due regard to the rights of all ... '"3 subject, of course, to compliance
with the statutory provisions relating to sale of mortgage of real
estate.
Thus, while the Colorado statutes give personal representatives
very substantial rights with regard to a decedent's real property,
they do not purport to change the common law concept of im-
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 152-10-13 (1953).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 152-13-6 (1953).
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mediate vesting of legal title in the heirs or devisees; nor do they
give the probate court any specific authority in a testate estate
to decree the manner in which title to real estate has devolved
under a will. This arrangement frequently places real property
involved in a decedent's estate in an awkward status. It is awkward
because, in moving away from the original common law concept
of complete divorcement of real property from estate administra-
tion and in moving toward placing the devolution of real property
under the control of the court and the personal representative,
we have stopped half-way. We have given the personal representa-
tive most of the practical attributes of ownership, including the
right to possession and income, but have left the legal title itself,
Kilowatts Came In U artons
You don't buy electrical energy by the carton, but if you did,
you'd find that the price of a quart of milk buys a lot of con-
venience. For example, a quarter's worth of electricity would operate
a steam iron under normal circumstances for about a month or your
vacuum cleaner for well over two months. Small wonder we say
electricity is still your biggest bargain In modern living.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
an, Inves~W-ownad uWI&r-ofl the move
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and the devolution of that title in the case of a will, exactly where
the common law originally had it-outside the estate proceeding.
A discussion follows of problems which arise under the pres-
ent posture of the law, closing with remedial proposals. The prob-
lems are divided into two categories: (1) Those relating to rights
in, and responsibilities toward, real property during administration
of an estate; and (2) title and conveyancing matters.
II. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES DURING ADMINISTRATION
Certain questions arise at present concerning the right to oc-
cupy real property, the enjoyment of income therefrom and the
responsibility for payment of taxes and expenses thereupon while
the property is subject to administration. Some of them are in-
terestingly illustrated by a 1959 Colorado case4 involving an estate
in which one of the assets was an apartment building productive
of rental income. A life estate in this property had been devised
by testator to his daughter, who received all rents from the apart-
ment subsequent to his death: The daughter paid the taxes on the
apartment for the year of testator's death, which taxes had been a
lien at the time of his death, and then requested reimbursement
from the estate for the taxes thus paid. The executrix refused, and
litigation ensued. In its opinion upholding the executrix, the court
pointed out that the daughter took title subject to any burdens or
encumbrances existing at the time of testator's death and that
since she had enjoyed the income from the property she should
assume the burden of taxes.
The action of the devisee-life tenant in taking possession of
the property and receiving the income therefrom was proper by
common law standards. Her assumption of the burdens related to
the property would simply be a counterpart to her assumption of
the benefits. Since the tax lien in Robinson v. Tubbs5 was a statu-
tory lien, and not a lien created by the voluntary action of the
testator, it would not, strictly speaking, appear to involve the
common law doctrine of exoneration. However, in a case6 decided
in the year following the decision in Robinson v. Tubbs which
properly presented the doctrine of exoneration for consideration,
the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the doctrine had pre-
viously been rejected by Robinson v. Tubbs.
As implied in passing in the Robinson case, statutes making
real property subject to administration have modified the common
law by permitting the personal representative to receive income
from real property during administration and have likewise shifted
the burden for payment of taxes and other expenses. While the
section making real property subject to administration does not,
in so many words, require the personal representative to pay taxes,
it has been judicially determined that payment of property taxes
is encompassed in his duty to "preserve the estate."7 The respon-
4 Robinson v. Tubbs, 140 Colo. 471, 334 P.2d 1080 (1959).
5 Ibid.
6 Ambrose v. Singleton, 144 Colo. 303, 356 P.2d 253 (1960).
7 Brown v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 74 F.2d 281, 285 (10th Cir.
1934); Kretsinger v. Brown, 165 Fed. 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1908).
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sibility of a personal representative to see that taxes are paid is
likewise implicit in that portion of the claims statute which pro-
vides that "wherever it may be necessary to preserve or protect
the estate for the benefit of persons in interest, the personal rep-
resentative may pay any tax, assessment or encumbrance without
the filing of a claim; : . ."
The general property tax law in effect until August 1, 1964,
refers specifically to the duty of fiduciaries to list property and
pay taxes thereon." While the new general property tax law no
longer requires owners tW list real property ° and contains no
language regarding payment of taxes by fiduciaries, there is no
reason to believe that the underlying responsibility of fiduciaries
for payment of taxes has been altered.
The Robinson case indicates that if the personal representative
had retained possession of the apartment property and the income
therefrom, the real property taxes would have been paid out of
the income. What if real property subject to administration is not
productive of income? Is the personal representative still respon-
sible for payment of taxes? Since the property is under the con-
trol of the personal representative and is available, if needed, for
satisfaction of claims against the estate, and since the personal
representative is charged with responsibility to protect and pre-
serve the assets, the responsibility logically should remain with
the personal representative.
If nonproductive real estate is part of the residuary estate,
taxes on it may be satisfied out of other residuary assets. It has
been held that taxes arising subsequent to the death of the tastator
and paid during administration by the personal representative
may be treated as expenses of administration.11 However, if the
real estate has been specifically devised and is not part of residue,
may the real property taxes still be charged against residue as
an expense of administration? If Ambrose v. Singleton12 does not
allow exoneration of specifically devised property as to liens ex-
isting at the death of testator, it is reasonable to think that the
same philosophy would apply to taxes incurred subsequent to
death. Thus, while the personal representative appears to be equal-
ly responsible for payment of taxes on real property subject to
administration whether it is specifically devised or part of residue,
the ultimate burden for taxes (and presumably other expenses)
attributable to specifically devised real estate would still seem
to fall upon the devisee.
The amorphous nature of rights in real property following the
death of the owner also creates problems in the assessment of real
property taxes. Because the identity of heirs or devisees may not
be known for some time after the death of the former owner, and
with or without the benefit of permissive statutes, assessments are
made variously in the name of the decedent, the estate of the
decedent, the heirs of devisees as a class, the personal representa-
8 COLO. REV. STAT. § 152-12-12 (Perm. Supp. 1960).
9 COLO. REV. STAT. § 137-3-23 (1953).
10 Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, § 137-5-2.
11 Supra note 8, at 285.
12 Supra note 6.
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tive, or to unknown owners. There is statutory authority in Colo-
rado for assessment to "owners unknown.' 1
3
The present practice in Denver County apparently is to assess
property in the name of an owner who may be deceased until such
time as the assessor is given actual notice of his death or until
such time as an instrument is recorded in the real property records
of the county which indicates his death. Upon receiving such no-
tice, the assessor then assesses the property in the name of the
estate of the former owner until such time as someone notifies the
assessor to assess taxes to him or until instruments are recorded
evidencing the succession of title.
While not discussed in the Robinson case, it is probable that
the executrix permitted the life tenant to receive income from the
apartment ab initio because of the fact that there were ample
additional assets of the estate to pay claims, death taxes and ex-
penses of administration, making it unnecessary for the executrix
to administer that property. Such a relinquishment of the right to
to administer real property either at the outset or during the course
of estate administration is, in effect, a partial distribution of the
real property. Unfortunately, there exists no well-defined means
by which real estate may be partially distributed during the course
of administration. Although a statute was passed in 1959 which
sanctions partial distributions to legatees or heirs,' there is con-
siderable doubt whether this provision can be considered to include
real property. The distribution made by the court on final settle-
ment of an estate covers only personal property, on the theory
that since title to real property vests immediately on death it is
not part of the property which the court distributes. If the court
does not distribute real property when an estate is closed, it seems
to follow that it would not do so in a partial distribution.
One exception which emphasizes the foregoing generalization
is found in a recent amendment to the statute governing the com-
position of the share of an electing spouse which provides that
"Any order of court made pursuant to this section providing for
the distribution of property shall be deemed to provide that any
real property disposed of by the order shall vest in the distri-
butee."15
Despite lack of apparent authority, the courts sometimes are
willing to enter orders tendered by counsel, such as the following
recorded decree which purported to effect a partial distribution of
Colorado real property:
Now on this day this matter coming on to be heard
upon the petition of the executor, and the court being ad-
vised in the premises, the court finds that as to the follow-
ing described real estate, to-wit: --- lying
and situated in the County of ........................ State of Colo-
rado and with respect to said real estate, this estate has
been administered according to law and the orders of this
court, and that, as respects the above described real estate,
ample and proper provision has been made for creditors
13 Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, § 137-5-2.
14 COLO. REV. STAT. § 152-14-5 (Perm. Supp. 1960).
15 COLO. REV. STAT. § 152-14-10 (Perm. Supp. 1960).
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of the estate, and for expenses of administration, and for
all other persons in interest, and that it is in the best in-
terests of said estate that the fiduciary be discharged as
respects the said real estate, wherefore,
IT IS ORDERED that -----------------------------------, executor,
be and he is hereby discharged with respect to his rights
to and responsibilities toward the above described real
estate only, and that title to said real estate may hence-
forth pass in accordance with law as if final distribution
had been made, and the final report herein filed and ap-
proved, and said fiduciary had been fully discharged.
Query as to the effect of that decree.
A personal representative or a court should be able to achieve
a partial distribution of real property in the same way that a par-
tial distribution of personality can be made. Statutory authority
to do so should be clear enough to avoid any title questions re-
lated to such a partial distribution.
In the same realm as the questions of taxation and partial
distribution previously discussed is the question of occupancy of
a family residence during administration. Theoretically, the per-
sonal representative should charge rent to whomever occupies the
property. One can readily imagine a widow's reaction to such a
suggestion. The potential harshness of this situation is ameliorated
to some extent by the statute giving the court authority to permit
the spouse or minor children to remain in possession without pay-
ment of rent for such period and upon such terms as the court
may deem just.16
It may be seen that the present posture of the law leaves some
areas of doubt concerning the relative rights and responsibilities
of personal representatives and heirs or devisees with regard to
real property of an estate during the period of administration.
Such doubts are best resolved by drawing wills which spell out
with precision the rights and responsibilities of the parties during
administration.
III. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING PROBLEMS
The first title problem considered hereunder is the question
of who can give a valid deed to real property which is subject to
16 COLO. REV. STAT. § 152-12-15 (1953).
KELLY GIRLS * Skilled * Tested * Bonded
Experienced Office Girls to Meet All Law Office Needs
ON YOUR STAFF & ON OUR PAYROLL
IN DENVER
IN COLORADO SPRINGS 292-2920 ° IN GREELEY
633-7646 900 Petroleum Club Bldg. ELgin 2-5922
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administration. Ordinarily, the conveyance will be by executor's
or administrator's deed and it is rare that the purchaser's attorney
will require the joinder of the heir or devisee who, in theory, is
the owner.
The ingenuity of the common law explains this seeming
anomaly of conveyance by someone other than the holder of legal
title by pointing out that the deed of the personal representative
serves to divest the title of the heir or devisee and give it to the
grantee. This, of course, has its parallel in other types of convey-
ance by public officials or officers of the court, such as sheriffs'
deeds or deeds of court appointed trustees. It also has its parallel
as to risk, if the personal representative thus conveying abuses
or exceeds the authority granted in the will or fails to comply
with necessary statutory requirements.
How about taking a deed from an heir or devisee while the
property he "owns" is subject to administration? If the estate can
be closed properly without resort to the property in question, the
title conveyed was good. Until the estate is closed, however, there
is at least the theoretical risk that title thus acquired will be di-
vested by the personal representative.
The second question for consideration is whether a will or
decree of heirship operates as an adequate muniment of title to
real property which was not owned by the decedent at death, and
which is taken in the name of the personal representative during
administration. This situation could arise when a personal rep-
resentative exchanges real property which was owned by the
decedent for other real estate, when a personal representative
purchases real property as an investment with funds of the estate
or perhaps, in rare instances, when some third party gives or de-
vises real property to the estate of the decedent so that the property
can be handled as part of that particular estate. While it has been
clear in Colorado that a will disposes of real property which a
testator acquired after he excuted the will but prior to his death,'
this carries the question one step further. The safest approach
would be to have the personal representative convey title to the
distributees at the appropriate time. However, suppose the estate
has been closed and the personal representative has failed to do
this. Should the estate be reopened for purposes of such a con-
veyance? If the personal representative has died in the meantime,
should a successor fiduciary be appointed solely for this purpose?
It is hard to conjure any rationale under which a will or decree
of heirship could be said to pass title to real property not owned
by the testator at death. To apply the doctrine of after-acquired
title to a testamentary disposition would be a perversion of that
doctrine. Such an approach would fly in the face of the notion of
17 Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 70 Pac. 429 (1902). Note however, that
the cited case relies upon statutory language similar to that found in COLO.
REV. STAT. § 152-5-2 (1953). That section was amended in 1957. The
present § 152-5-2 (Perm. Supp. 1960) omits the phrase appearing in earlier
versions "which he or she has or at the time of his or her death shall
have." It is improbable that the legislature intended to re-establish the
common law rule that a will does not pass title to real property acquired




immediate vesting upon death. Further, it would produce an
improper and unintended result in the situation where the per-
sonal representative uses personalty of the estate to purchase
real property if the real and personal property do not pass to the
same parties, and in the same proportions.
The final title problem treated here is the difficulty in es-
tablishing the devolution of title to real estate under a will which is
not, in and of itself, a sufficient muniment of title. The insuf-
ficiency of a will as a muniment of title will be examined in two
contexts: (1) Where a specific devise contains an inadequate legal
description; and (2) where distribution of real property is discre-
tionary with the executor.
Consider first a devise of residential property without a spe-
cific legal description, such as:
I devise unto my wife all my right, title and interest
in such real property and improvements thereon as she
and I are using as our residence or residences at the time
of my death, subject to any lien or liens existing against
said property at the time of my death, if she survives me.
This type of devise need not be criticized, since many testa-
tors are likely to change their residence without thinking to
change their will, in which case the devise might adeem if it set
forth only the specific legal description of the former residence.
Nevertheless, this type of will provision standing alone does not
provide an adequate muniment of title. It is necessary to record
an additional document which will establish the proper legal
description of the property referred to by the general language
in the will.
However, since title already was vested in the devisee and is
not being divested, none of the instruments referred to conveys
title, but is simply in explanation thereof. Perhaps that is enough.
The trouble is that in the absence of an established and uniformly
accepted practice the lawyer who handles the estate and the lawyer
who later examines the title may not agree as to the proper method.
Consider finally a will in which the executor is given discretion
to distribute real property in a disproportionate manner. For ex-
ample, an estate might include mineral interests having consider-
able potential value but producing no present income. Such assets
would not be particularly appropriate in a marital trust giving
the surviving spouse a life estate with power of appointment.' 8
The executor probably should distribute all of these mineral in-
terests to other beneficiaries and avoid a proportionate distribution
of them to the martial trust.
In another case, a testator might have as his equal benefi-
ciaries a son who is in the ranching business in Colorado and a
daughter living in another state. If the testator's estate includes
Colorado ranch property, it very probably would make sense to
satisfy the son's legacy with this type of interest and give the
daughter cash, securities or other personal property which she
could manage more easily.
It is in such situations, where the testator purposely refrains
Is See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (5) (1958).
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from specifically devising real property by his will and in which
an executor is given broad discretionary authority in the dis-
tribution of real estate, that the common law rule of immediate
vesting in devisees seems farthest removed from both reality and
desirability. In fact, if a subsequent disproportionate distribution
of real property by the executor results in a theoretical "divest-
ment" of interests previously vested, the resulting rearrangement
of interest might be treated by the tax authorities as a taxable
exchange.
Here again, the will alone is not an adequate muniment of
title and one or more additional instruments must appear of record
to set forth the actual devolution of title, such as a quit claim
deed or assignment from one beneficiary to another, a decree, a
deed or other instrument of conveyance by the executor, or perhaps
a combination of several of these, none of which enjoys definite
sanction. There is doubt whether the statute subjecting real prop-
erty to administration or any other provision of the Colorado
statutes gives a probate court authority to enter an order decreeing
a disproportionate distribution of real property which is binding,
particularly if such a decree is entered as a routine part of ad-
ministration without special notice to the parties affected. As
mentioned earlier, the schedule of distribution in a final report
deals only with personal property and does not purport to dis-
tribute real estate, which is consistent with the common law
theory. Although some of our probate courts will enter decrees
purporting to dispose of real property when tendered by counsel,
the effectiveness of such decrees is questionable at best.
IV. REMEDIAL PROPOSALS
It might be appropriate to consider one or two possible solu-
tions to the problems which have been presented. The most drastic
and perhaps the most effective solution would be to abolish com-
pletely the common law rule of vesting in heirs or devisees and
provide, instead for vesting of legal title to real property in
the personal representative. This would avoid the ambivalence now
existing as a result of ownership by a devisee on the one hand and
practical control by the personal representative on the other hand.
All of the rights and responsibilities as to a decedent's real prop-
erty would be centralized in the personal representative until such
time as title was conveyed to the beneficial owner upon a partial
or final distribution. The deed of the fiduciary then would be the
principal muniment of title rather than a will or decree of heir-
ship.
Although no state in this country is known to have adopted
such a far-reaching statute, the statutory rule in England since
1897 has been that real property devolves upon the personal repre-
sentative in the same manner as personal property. 19 England, the
source of our common law, has frequently shown more flexibility
than we in discarding or revising common law principles dis-
satisfying the needs of the time.
19 Land Transfer Act, 1897, 60 & 61 VICT., c. 65, § 1, superseded by Admin-
istration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 GEo. 5, c. 23, § 1.
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In the absence of statutory authorization, the same result
could be achieved in an individual estate by an appropriate will
provision vesting title in the personal representative. A provision
appearing in a recent edition of Trusts and Estates is designed to
accomplish this result:
In the event that my wife survives me and there should
be included in my residuary estate any interest in real
estate, I direct that ownership of such interest shall vest
in the first instance in my Executor, even though under ap-
plicable local law title would otherwise pass directly to the
the devisee, and that my Executor shall make the division,
allocation, and conveyance of the same and the net income
therefrom between the trusts as above provided.20
A more limited solution is afforded by the Model Probate Code,
which provides specifically for a decree of final distribution which,
rather than the will, is to be the significant muniment of title and
which is required to distribute by specific description every tract
of real property which is subject to administration.2 1 The Model
Probate Code further provides that the decree is to be a conclu-
sive determination of the persons who are the successors in in-
terest to the estate of the decedent and of the extent and character
of their interests therein, and requires that a certified copy of the
decree "be recorded by the personal representative in every coun-
ty . . . in which real property distributed by the decree is situ-
ated. ' '22 Such a decree would provide a more effective method of
establishing the passage of record title than does a will supported
by various other explanatory documents of questionable effect
and effectiveness. The weakness of the Model Probate Code is that
its retain the concept of immediate vesting in devisees 2 and,
therefore, retains the same potential for confusion during the
period of administration which exists under our present practice.
21 Durbin, Marital Deduction Formula Revisited, 102 TRUSTS & ESTATES 545,
610-11 (1963).
21 SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 183 .(1946).
22 Id. at § 183(e).
23 Id. at §§ 84 and 124 and comment following § 124.
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